Light Giver 23

Company of People

The primary and literal meaning of ἀναπέμπω (anapempō) is “to send up”—originally in a spatial or directional sense, often from a lower to a higher place. The verb is compounded from:

• ἀνά (ana) – “up,” “upward”

• πέμπω (pempō) – “to send”

Core semantic range:

1. Literal spatial use – e.g., sending or moving someone or something upward:

   • to higher ground (Xen. Cyr. 7.5.34)

   • from the coast inland, or toward a metropolis like Rome (Plb. 1.7.12)

   • in military, physical, or geographic contexts

2. Institutional/jurisdictional metaphor – From this concrete idea of "sending upward," it developed a figurative legal-administrative use:

   • “remit,” “refer to a higher authority,” especially judicially or politically

   • E.g., Luke 23:7,15: “Pilate sent him up to Herod”, reflecting this juridical protocol of referral to someone of higher or equivalent rank

   • Frequently seen in papyrological texts from the Hellenistic and Roman periods (PHib., PTeb., BGU, etc.)

3. Extended metaphorical uses:

   • Transmit (e.g., ideas, impressions)

   • Ascribe (e.g., attributing something upwards or to a higher source)

   • Trace back (e.g., genealogy—“send [a lineage] up toward someone”)

(cf. LSJ ἀναπέμπω)

To Discipline as a Child

When a common classical Greek word appears to be used in an exclusive, even bizarre manner by the NT writers, the practice of scholars is to assign it a "special NT usage."

The verb παιδεύω, from which παιδεύσας derives (aorist active participle), is classically and overwhelmingly attested in the semantic field of education, cultivation, and training, not punishment. Rooted in παῖς (child), it designates the process of intellectual and moral formation, often in contrast to mere physical sustenance (τρέφειν). In authors from Sophocles to Plato and Xenophon, παιδεύειν refers to educating the youth (e.g., Pl. Rep. 430a), training in virtue (εἰς ἀρετήν, Pl. Gorg. 519e), and general cultural formation (οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι as “the educated,” Pl. Rep. 606e). Even metaphorical usages preserve the core idea of refinement: e.g., ὕβρις πεπαιδευμένη (Arist. Rh. 1389b11) as “chastened insolence,” not “punished,” but modulated into grace.

However, LSJ’s inclusion of a late and anomalous gloss under III.2—“chastise, punish”—signals the semantic deviation confined to Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic texts, notably the Septuagint (e.g., Hos. 7.12) and here in Luke 23.16. The very structure of the lexicon betrays this shift: rather than revising the primary definition, the editors cordon off this sense in a discreet subcategory, masking what is in fact a radical semantic innovation under the guise of a marginal extension (a.k.a "extended/tropical" definitions). Thus, a word once reserved for instruction and cultural elevation is presented, without sufficient philological justification, as also meaning scourge or punish—but only in contexts shaped by theological or translational agendas.

What?

This maneuver—whether conscious or not—amounts to lexical laundering: the repurposing of a culturally prestigious word for a concept it never bore in classical usage, while giving the impression of continuity. The result is that readers of the NT may receive a severe and punitive reading of παιδεύειν, unaware that such a usage is a stark departure from Greek linguistic norms, not an extension of them. The classical παιδεία "education"—so central to the Greek ideal of human flourishing—is thus quietly subordinated to a wholly foreign interpretive framework.

Why choose such a word in the first place?

In effect, readers are led to believe they are reading this:

μαστιγόω (verb) Strong's #3146

• Primary meaning: to whip, to scourge, flog
• Classical usage: employed for literal acts of whipping or flogging.
• NT usage: e.g., Matthew 20:19 – καὶ μαστιγώσουσιν αὐτόν (“and they will scourge him”).

Other interesting words to note:

κολάζω (verb) Strong's #2849

• Primary meaning: to punish, chastise, inflict corrective penalty
• Classical usage: Used in judicial, philosophical, and civic contexts to indicate corrective punishment—that is, punishment aimed at reform or deterrence, not vengeance. It appears frequently in Plato, Xenophon, and oratory (e.g., Lysias, Demosthenes). Plato (Gorg. 525b) distinguishes κολάζω from τιμωρέω, noting that κολάζειν aims to improve the offender rather than exact retribution.

ἐπεφώνουν does not primarily mean “shout” in the generic sense of loud yelling.

Its core meaning is more precise:

“to call upon,” “to invoke aloud,” or “to utter in directed speech.”

That can include shouting, if the context implies volume, but the verb itself does not inherently denote loudness or force.

Compare:

• βοάω — “to shout,” “to cry out loudly” (focus on volume)

• κράζω — “to scream,” “to shriek” (intensely vocal)

• φωνέω / ἐπιφωνέω — “to speak,” “to call (upon)” (focus on direction, not volume)

So if a mob ἐπεφώνουν, they were likely vocally invoking or calling upon someone—perhaps loudly, but the verb itself does not mean “to shout” by default.

Primary meaning (according to Middle Liddell):

“to mention by name, tell of”
— e.g., Sophocles, where the sense is naming or referring to something aloud.

This directly reflects the literal sense of ἐπιφωνέω as “to voice upon” — that is, to direct speech toward something with specificity, such as naming it, calling it out, or designating it.

Secondary:

“to say upon or with respect to” — τινί (to someone), εἴς τι (with reference to something)
— Seen in Plutarch, and aligns with uses like applying a phrase or label to someone or something.

(cf. Middle Liddell ἐπιφωνέω)

The construction αἰτοῦσιν αὐτὸν σταυρωθῆναι should be understood as “they ask him to be staked/crucified”, with αὐτόν functioning as the person addressed (accusative of the person asked), and σταυρωθῆναι as the infinitive expressing the requested action.

This is a standard idiom in Greek: αἰτέω τινά τι ποιῆσαι, “to ask someone to do something.” It must be distinguished from “they ask for him to be crucified,” which would require a different construction—e.g., αἰτοῦσιν τὴν σταύρωσιν αὐτοῦ (“they ask for his crucifixion”) or αἰτοῦσιν ἵνα σταυρωθῇ (“they ask that he be crucified”). In the participial form, αἰτούμενοι αὐτὸν expects an infinitive complement to complete its sense.

Any time a pronoun follows this verb in the NT (him, father, me, etc.) it is refering to the person asked, not as an indirect object asked for. 

Valley of Decision

The phrase ἐπέκρινε γενέσθαι τὸ αἴτημα αὐτῶν in its straight, unadulterated translation means "he decided to become their demand." This construction clearly portrays the subject's decision to undergo a transformation, becoming what the petition represents, i.e., a change of state in relation to the petition itself. However, many traditional translations of this passage, such as

"decided that their demand should be granted," 

"gave sentence that it should be as they required,"

"decided to have their demand carried out,"

or "sentenced their demand to be done,"

require significant grammatical alterations that depart from the original Greek.

To render these idiomatic translations, several grammatical changes must be made:

1. The aorist middle infinitive γενέσθαι ("to become") must be reinterpreted as an active construction, which it is not. This necessitates a shift from the middle voice (which implies a self-directed or reflective action) to an active one, such as ἐκρίθη ("was decided") or ἐξελέγη ("was chosen"), which would imply an external action or decision regarding the petition.

2. The noun αἴτημα ("petition") would need to be altered to a term that indicates an object of a legal decision or demand, such as αἴτημα ἐκπληρωθῆναι ("a petition to be fulfilled"), introducing an entirely new verbal form (like ἐκπληρόω "to fulfill") that does not appear in the original.

3. The phrase "to be done" or "granted," as seen in these retranslations, introduces verbs or passive constructions that are simply absent in the Greek, thus violating the syntactic structure of the original sentence.

In sum, these reworkings demand not only a semantic shift but also a substantial restructuring of the original grammar, transforming it into a form that aligns with conventional legal or procedural language rather than staying true to the original metaphorical and philosophical sense of γενέσθαι ("to become").

Does this process not reflect a profound distortion of the author's intended meaning, reducing the original depiction of a decision to undergo a transformation into a more conventional and legalistic interpretation of judgment?

Cyrene in Greek mythology is a huntress nymph known for her beauty and hunting skills, who was abducted by Apollo and taken to North Africa. The city of Cyrene, founded by Apollo in her honor, reflects her significance in Greek mythology and the cultural impact of her story.

"a champion in the leafy forest with lionslaying hands" (Nonnus, Dionysiaca 25. 180 ff)

The phrase ὃν μὲν ἐκ δεξιῶν, ὃν δὲ ἐξ ἀριστερῶν employs a classical μὲν...δέ construction, a common Greek syntactic device used to indicate contrast or parallelism. Literally translated as “whom on the one hand from the right, whom on the other hand from the left,” it typically introduces two groups or actions proceeding from opposite directions. Such phrasing often appears in historiographical, military, or descriptive narrative to denote bifurcated movement or attention.

The Greek verb ἔλεγεν is the imperfect active indicative of λέγω (“to say”), and properly conveys continuous or repeated action in the past.

While most English translations render it simply as “he said,” this corresponds more directly to the aorist form εἶπεν, which denotes a punctiliar or completed action. In contrast, the imperfect form ἔλεγεν should be translated as “he was saying,” “he kept saying,” or “he used to say,” preserving its imperfective aspect.

Rendering it as “he said,” covers up this meaning and is grammatically imprecise, as it fails to communicate the ongoing or habitual nature of the action encoded in the Greek tense. For rigorous exegetical or linguistic work, the imperfect sense must be maintained.

The term παράδεισος (also attested as παράδισος, e.g. SIG 463.8, Crete, 3rd century B.C.) originally denoted an “enclosed park” or “pleasure-ground,” an Oriental loanword first employed by Xenophon exclusively in reference to the parks of Persian kings and nobles (cf. Anab. 1.2.7; 2.4.14; Cyr. 1.3.14; Hellenica 4.1.15; see also Theophrastus Hist. Plant. 4.4.1; AJA 16.13 [Sardes, 300 B.C.]; LXX Nehemiah 2.8; Plutarch Art. 25). More generally, it came to mean “garden” or “orchard” (e.g., PRev.Laws 33.11; PCair.Zen. 33.3; OGI 90.15; LXX Canticum 4.13; Ecclesiastes 2.5; CIG 2694b; PFay. 55.7). The phrase “garden of Eden” appears in the Septuagint (Genesis 2.8).

Later, especially in the Christian tradition, παράδεισος came to signify “Paradise,” the "abode of the blessed" as an explanation of the μακάρων νῆσοι (“isles of the blessed,” Proclus ad Hesiod Op. 169).

LSJ notes its Persian origin in pairidaēza- (“enclosure”) and the word’s semantic shift from a physical royal garden to a religious and idealized paradise (cf. Pollux 9.13; Photios; Avesta).

— Liddell–Scott–Jones, s.v. παράδεισος.

The verb ἐκλείπω (ἐκ + λείπω) bears the core sense of “cease,” “fail,” or “disappear,” but in many contexts it specifically connotes “leaving off,” “quitting,” or “forsaking” an action or state. When used with a genitive, participle, or complement clause, it denotes the abandonment or cessation of that thing (e.g., ἐκλιπόντος τοῦ βίου, Soph. El. 1131, “departing from life”; ἐκλείπειν θεραπείας σώματος, Plut. Marc. 17, “to neglect bodily care”). While “quit” in modern English may suggest volitional cessation, ἐκλείπω need not always imply intent, though many uses (e.g., renouncing power or deserting a post) do. See LSJ, s.v. ἐκλείπω; Bailly, s.v. ἐκλείπω.

Strongs #G707. The term Ἁριμαθαίας (Harimathaias) in Greek is derived from the Hebrew ארמיתים (Arimathaim). The Hebrew name ארמיתים is believed to be a compound of:

• ארמי (armai) – meaning "high" or "exalted," from the Hebrew רמה (a height)
• תים (tayim) – the dual suffix indicating "two," suggesting a place with a dual or two-fold aspect.

The verb ἡσυχάζω (fut. -άσω; aor. ἡσύχᾰσα) primarily means "to keep quiet," "to be at rest," or "to be silent" (LSJ s.v. ἡσυχάζω). It is frequently used intransitively, e.g., οἱ πολέμιοι ἡσύχαζον ("the enemies were quiet," Xen. An. 5.4.16). However, LSJ also records a transitive (causative) usage meaning "to bring to rest," "impose silence," or "make quiet," e.g., ἡσυχάσας τῶ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας (Plato, Republic 572a) and ἡσυχάζων in the sense of "impose silence" (D.C. 69.6). When ἡσύχασαν is followed by an accusative object, the causative sense ("they made [someone/something] quiet") is strongly implied, as the direct object indicates the entity affected by the action. Thus, context and presence of an accusative complement are key to distinguishing between "they were quiet" (intransitive) and "they made quiet" (causative).